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Airport screening for Ebola
Will it make a difference?
David Mabey professor, Stefan Flasche lecturer, W John Edmunds professor
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1E 7HT, UK
On 9 October the UK government announced that “enhanced
screening” for Ebola virus disease will be implemented at
Heathrow and Gatwick airports and Eurostar terminals. Details
of how this will be done are not yet available, but the objectives
presumably are to identify people arriving from Sierra Leone,
Guinea, or Liberia whomay have been exposed to Ebola, assess
whether they have symptoms consistent with Ebola, test those
who do, and isolate anyone with positive results.
Several practical difficulties will need to be overcome to achieve
these objectives. As most direct flights to the UK from Sierra
Leone, Guinea, and Liberia have been discontinued because of
the epidemic, passengers will be arriving from various European
cities, and itineraries will need to be carefully checked to
identify passengers arriving from those countries. Those who
are identified will be asked to complete a questionnaire stating
whether they have been in contact with sick people or have
attended funerals in west Africa, and whether they have
symptoms such as fever, headache, diarrhoea, or vomiting.
People who answer “yes” to any of these questions will
presumably be referred to a health official, which is likely to
lead to considerable delays; this would not be an incentive to
fill in the form honestly. A thermal scanning device may also
be used to check passengers’ temperature on arrival, but it is
unclear what will happen to those found to have a fever. Most
will not have Ebola. Even if testing facilities are on site,
substantial delays to large numbers of passengers seem
inevitable, and isolation of all passengers waiting for their test
results may prove challenging.
The World Health Organization recommends that passengers
on international flights out of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia
should be screened for evidence of Ebola before boarding their
flight. Those with symptoms or a raised temperature should not
be allowed on the flight. Clearly, identifying people with Ebola
before they board an international flight is a desirable objective.
But how well does this system work in practice? Data are not
available on the number of passengers denied entry to a flight
during the current epidemic, but there are strong incentives for
those wishing to fly to deny symptoms even if they have them
and to take an antipyretic such as aspirin to bring down their
temperature if they have a fever.
Lack of evidence
Is there any evidence that screening travellers arriving at
international airports is an effective way of identifying those
with serious infections? The data fromCanada, which introduced
airport screening during the SARS (severe acute respiratory
syndrome) epidemic, are not encouraging. A total of 677 494
people arriving in Canada returned completed questionnaires,
of whom 2478 answered “yes” to one or more question. A
specially trained nurse referred each of these for in-depth
questioning and temperature measurement; none of them had
SARS. Thermal scanners were installed at six major airports.
Of the 467 870 people screened, 95 were referred to a nurse for
further assessment. None of themwas confirmed to have a raised
temperature. The cost of this unsuccessful programme was
$CA17m (£9m; €12m; $15m).1
Why was this measure so ineffective, and could it work now?
During the SARS epidemic a simple model was used to assess
the fraction of cases that could be detected by entrance
screening.2Assuming that people with symptoms are not allowed
to board, entrance screening can only pick up those who develop
symptoms while travelling. The longer the incubation period in
relation to the flight duration, the lower the chance that this will
happen, and the lower the yield from entrance screening.
Updating the model using data on Ebola (incubation time
9.1±7.3 days3; direct flight from Freetown to London 6.42
hours), we estimate that, if everyone with symptoms was denied
boarding, about 7 out of 100 people infected with Ebola
travelling to the UKwould have symptoms on arrival and hence
be detectable by entrance screening (95% confidence interval
3 to 13). The other 93% would enter the UK unimpeded. If
passengers arriving via Paris or Brussels (journey time about
13 hours) were not screened in transit, entrance screening in the
UK could detect up to 13% of infected people (95% CI 7% to
21%). The majority would still enter the UK before developing
symptoms. Only if patients are allowed to fly irrespective of
symptoms would entrance screening be able to detect a
substantial fraction of cases (43% if there is no direct flight,
95% CI 34% to 53%).
People who know they are at risk and develop symptoms will
want to seek care immediately, as they will fear for their lives.
The priority should be to provide information to all those who
may be at risk on how and where to seek care. This would be
as effective as screening at a fraction of the cost.
Adopting the policy of “enhanced screening” gives a false sense
of reassurance. Our simple calculations show that an entrance
screening policy will have no meaningful effect on the risk of
importing Ebola into the UK. Better use of the UK’s resources
would be to immediately scale-up our presence in west
Africa—building new treatment centres at a rate that outstrips
the epidemic, thereby averting a looming humanitarian crisis
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of frightening proportions. In so doing, we would not only help
the people of these affected countries but also reduce the risk
of importation to the UK.
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